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NOTES
STRICT IN THEORY, NOT FATAL IN FACT:'
AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS IN THE WAKE OF
ADARAND V. PENA
The civil rights movement of the 1960s sparked a political and
societal realization that discrimination based on immutable char-
acteristics such as race was wrong.2 In particular, racial equality
1 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972). In analyzing the Supreme Court's reluctance to uphold legislation under the strict
scrutiny standard of review, Gunther characterized strict scrutiny as "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact." Id.; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995). The
Court sought "to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'"
Id. Justice O'Connor expressly stated that racial discrimination is still an "unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it." Id. There have
been times when the Court has upheld legislation under strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). In Roe, the Court analyzed and upheld state bans on
post-viability abortions under strict scrutiny. Id.; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 219 (1944). Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Court strictly scrutinized and
sustained a military order excluding Americans of Japanese origin from designated Pacific
Coast areas. Id.; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943). Under strict
scrutiny, the Court upheld a military curfew order detaining persons of Japanese ancestry
on the Pacific Coast during World War II. Id.
2 See Dena S. Davis, Ironic Encounter: African-Americans, American Jews, and the
Church-State Relationship, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 109, 132-33 (1993). This article quoted
Jesse Jackson who intimated that Rosa Parks' refusal to relinquish her seat on a segre-
gated bus motivated Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the black church to organize boycotts.
Id. In effect, these boycotts marked the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement. Id.; Daniel
Gyebi, A Tribute to Courage on the Fortieth Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Educ., 38
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became a prominent issue in American politics and to the Ameri-
can people.3 As a result, the three branches of the federal govern-
ment aggressively sought to eradicate decades of institutional dis-
crimination by implementing new policies to combat old
prejudices.4
Congress responded to the movement by enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act expressly pro-
hibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin,
How. L.J. 23, 27 (1994). Gyebi discussed that the police responded to civil rights demon-
strators participating in the Birmingham protests with fire hoses, arrests, clubs, and jail
terms. Id. Further, African-American children at the demonstrations were attacked by fe-
rocious police dogs. Id. This scene from Alabama was depicted on national television and
shocked the nation's conscience. Id. For many Americans, this was the first time they wit-
nessed the extreme racial violence occurring in the South. Id. These scenes sparked an
awareness of existing racial inequality and gathered support for the civil rights movement.
Id.; David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading
to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 645-47 (1995).
Americans were horrified as they watched the violent police reaction to African-American
children kneeling in prayer during the Birmingham protests. Id. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 was a direct response by President Kennedy to the Birmingham protests. Id. See gen-
erally ROBERT WEISBRoT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIvIL Riors MovE.
MENTr 45-85 (Norton Page ed., Penguin Books 1991). Weisbrot explains that television cov-
erage of police brutality toward African-Americans in Alabama stirred indignation among
Americans who had long been complacent about racism. Id. This provided the civil rights
movement with the urgency it needed. Id.
3 See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Any-
more, 47 STAN. L. REv. 957, 958 (1995). This article portrays the 1960s as a decade striving
to end "nearly a century of legislative and judicial decisionmaking that tolerated, and at
times, even mandated different... treatment of citizens solely on the basis of skin color."
Id.; Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harass-
ment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 461, 481 (1995).
Sangree states that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in response to a popular de-
mand for constitutional equality protection for African-Americans. Id.
4 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1988); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 8-12 (1967) (holding that state law prohibiting interracial marriages violated Equal
Protection Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58
(1964) (applying commerce clause to restrict racial discrimination because such "moral and
social wrong" obstructed interstate commerce); Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977
(1961) (prohibiting contractors from applying racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices); Validity of Executive Order Prohibiting Government Contractors from Discriminat-
ing in Employment Practices on Grounds of Race, Color, Religion or National Origin, 42
Op. Att'y Gen. 97, 103 (1961) (arguing validity of Presidential authority to proscribe ra-
cially discriminatory employment practices in construction industry). See generally NLJOLE
V. BENOKxRAIis & JOE R. FEAGIN, AFFmMATrivE ACTION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY: ACTION,
INACTION AND REACTION 7-24 (Westview Press 1978) (detailing executive, legislative, and
judicial attempts to eradicate race discrimination during 1960s).
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting
racial restrictions in voting, commerce, education, and employment as prerequisite to re-
ceive federal funding); see Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Com-
parative Procedural History of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964 and 1991, 104 YALE L.J.
1201, 1215-22 (1995) (outlining procedural history of Civil Rights Act of 1964). See gener-
ally ROBERT D. LOEVY, To END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE
CivIL RIGHrS AMENDMENT OF 1964 1-3 (1990) (stating that Civil Rights Act was "landmark
legislation" which turned country from "legal segregation" to "racial integration"); CHARLES
WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
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or sex.' The Act provided the necessary legal foundation on which
discrimination claims could be based and became an integral
mechanism in the battle for equal rights.7
The United States Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren,8 also took an active role in protecting individual rights.'
Civil rights organizations, unable to achieve equality through the
political process, petitioned the Court for redress.' 0 When inter-
CIviL RIGHTs AcT 100-48, 194-229 (1985) (detailing legislative history that culminated in
Act).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a).
7 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401, 403 (1968) (per curiam)
(holding that drive-in restaurant near interstate highway was within scope of Civil Rights
Act of 1964); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966) (noting exercise of
right to equal accommodation by not subjecting African-Americans to trespass prosecu-
tion); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 793, 804-06 (1966) (holding that threat of state pros-
ecution because African-American attempted to obtain services at public accommodation
denied federal civil rights and warranted removal of case to federal court); Blow v. North
Carolina, 379 U.S. 684, 685-86 (1965) (per curiam) (holding that violation of Civil Rights
Act of 1964 occurred when motel and adjoining restaurant on interstate highway adver-
tised on billboards and radio, and posted restaurant menu in motel); Hamm v. City of Rock
Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 308 (1964) (vacating convictions for sit-ins based on state trespass stat-
utes because Act forbids discrimination in places of public accommodation); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964) (upholding Title II of Civil Rights Act under Com-
merce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261 (confirming that Civil Rights Act of
1964 is within Congress's Commerce Clause authority); see also Newman, 390 U.S. at 401
(stating that private litigation would be necessary to secure compliance with Civil Rights
Act).
8 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, TBE SuPREME COURT UNDER EARL WAMEN 73-107
(Quandrangle Books 1972) (examining Earl Warren's effect on Supreme Court jurispru-
dence); ARNOLD S. RCE, THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969 53-207 (Associated Faculty Press
1987) (detailing decisions of Warren Court); JOHN D. WEAVER, WARREN: TmE MAN, THE ERA
201-18 (1967) (discussing Earl Warren and his tenure on Supreme Court).
9 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1967) (holding that prohibition of interra-
cial marriage violated Equal Protection Clause); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470-72
(1966) (requiring police to inform individuals in custody of constitutional right to counsel
and privilege against self-incrimination); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (establishing marital privacy right in contraception use); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 568 (1964) (concluding that state legislature apportionment based on race violated
Equal Protection Clause); see Gyebi, supra note 2, at 37-40 (discussing Chief Justice Earl
Warren's instrumental role in promoting justice by advancing civil rights during tenure on
Court). See generally ARCHmALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONsTrTroN 177-183 (Hough-
ton Mifflin Co. 1987) (recognizing Warren Court as instrument of reform by initiating
changes in social and political order); G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30
Hous. L. REV. 1509, 1558-60 (1993) (stating that Warren Court focused on three fundamen-
tal rights, right of interstate mobility, right of equal access to political process and right to
equal access in judicial process during criminal proceedings); John E. Nowak, The Rise and
Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 345, 405
(1995) (noting commitment of Warren Court in protecting racial minorities from discrimi-
nation); David O'Brien, Rehnquist Tilt: Court No Longer Willing to Confront Issues of Ra-
cism, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, July 9, 1995, at J5 (explaining that landmark Brown v.
Board of Educ. decision began era led by Earl Warren's court that lent legitimacy to civil
rights movement).
10 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 305 (1964) (holding that failure to prop-
erly register as foreign corporation to do business in state did not warrant permanent
ouster of association from state); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (rendering
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preting the law, the Court exhibited a concern for minorities and
responded to their plight."
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order
No. 11,246 to further the movement toward equality among the
races.12 The Order required federal contractors to affirmatively re-
cruit and employ racial minorities. 1 3 The ideals expressed by Pres-
ident Johnson were implemented by President Richard M. Nixon
when he approved the Philadelphia Plan, the first modern affirm-
ative action program.' 4 The Philadelphia Plan responded to bla-
activities of NAACP modes of expression and association protected by First and Fourteenth
Amendments which state may not prohibit as "improper solicitations of legal business");
NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1959) (foreclosing Alabama Supreme Court from
reexamining grounds of disposition once it had held that association satisfactorily complied
with Court Order); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that order re-
quiring NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of members denied due
process right to freedom of association).
11 See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 423 (1968) (holding that statute providing all citi-
zens with right to purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property barred
all public and private racial discrimination in sale or rental of property); Harper v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding Virginia's poll tax which imple-
mented discriminatory voter qualifications violative of Equal Protection Clause and thus
unconstitutional); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1963) (holding that where
city police chiefs official command directed continuance of segregated service in private
restaurants, trespass convictions resulting from attempts of Negroes to be served in pri-
vately owned restaurant could not stand); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457-61 (1960)
(holding that discrimination in food service industry based on color constituted violation of
federal rights under Interstate Commerce Act).
12 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(Supp. I 1989) (banning discrimination by federal contractors based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin); accord President Nixon's State of the Union Message, 7 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 89, 93 (Jan. 23, 1971) (stating "[n]either the President nor the Congress
nor the conscience of this nation can permit money which comes from all the people to be
used in a way that discriminates against some of the people"); see also BENOKRAITIS & FEA-
GIN, supra note 4, at 11-12, 23 (suggesting that Executive Order 11,246 provided basis for
affirmative action programs); Karen S. Bryan, Note, Recovery of Back Pay Under Executive
Order 11,246, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 767, 768-69 (1979) (explaining that Executive Order
11,246 sparked series of race conscious legislation to assure equal opportunity and combat
discrimination); Peter G. Nash, Note, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46
N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 225-31 (1971) (detailing history and effect of Executive Order 11,246 in
implementing government-initiated affirmative action programs). But see Andree K. Blum-
stein, Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way: The Case for Delimiting Presidential Power Under
Executive Order No. 11,246, 33 VAND. L. REV. 921, 927-28 (1980) (suggesting President
lacks authority to implement Executive Order 11,246).
13 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)
(Supp. I 1989); see also BENOKRAfrIS & FEAGIN, supra note 4, at 23 (stating that President
Johnson's Executive Order required all federal contracts to include clause agreeing "not to
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, reli-
gion or national origin").
14 See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Lab., 442 F.2d 159, 171, 176 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). The Court upheld the validity of the Philadelphia Plan by
rejecting statutory and constitutional challenges to Executive Order No. 11,246 and con-
cluding that the Plan was within the implied authority of President. Id.; see also 118 CONG.
REC. 1661 (1972). Senator Erwin opposed the Philadelphia Plan and introduced an amend-
ment in Congress that sought to prevent any federal agency or officer of the United States
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tant segregation and discrimination within the construction in-
dustry by creating minority hiring goals and timetables to
promote racial equality. 15
Within the past thirty years, the commitment to racial equality
displayed by the American public in the 1960s has transformed
into a backlash against affirmative action. 16 The same three
from requiring an employer to practice reverse discrimination by employing persons of a
particular race in either "fixed or variable numbers, proportions, percentages, quotas, goals
or ranges." Id. This amendment was overwhelmingly rejected by Congress indicating its
support for the Philadelphia Plan. Id. Senator Javitz opposed the amendment and stated
that a vote for the amendment would dismantle Executive Order No. 11,246 and deprive
courts of the opportunity to order affirmative action under Title VII as necessary to correct
a history of unjust and illegal discrimination. Id. at 1664-65; Daniel A. Farber, The Outmo-
ded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 896 (1994). This article noted that
Nixon was successful in campaigning against Senate attempts to dismantle the Philadel-
phia Plan. Id.; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections
on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 685,
712-23 (1991). It is indicated that President Nixon supported the Philadelphia Plan for
three reasons: (1) the Plan was initiated by the Secretary of Labor who was a strong be-
liever in civil rights; (2) the President was in need of liberal support, and (3) it was seen as
an opportunity to wedge organized labor away from civil rights. Id.; James E. Jones, Jr.,
The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic, Legal and
Political Realities, 70 IowA L. REV. 901, 910-11 (1985). Jones recognizes that the political
appeal of the Philadelphia Plan is what motivated President Nixon to take on a Democratic
Congress in order to have Plan approved. Id.; James E. Jones, Jr., The Origins of Affirma-
tive Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 393-94 (1988). It is discussed that the Philadelphia
Plan implemented during President Nixon's presidency was significant because it provided
a framework and articulated standards for future affirmative action programs. Id.; David
L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity
Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1141-43 (1989). Rose states that President
Nixon staunchly supported Philadelphia Plan and its efforts to achieve nondiscrimination
in government contract hiring. Id.; Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The Philadelphia Plan:
A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739-750 (1972). This
article outlines original criticisms of Philadelphia Plan which were modified by Nixon's
administration before suggesting it as a means of remedying past discrimination. Id. See
generally HUGH D. GRAHAM, Tha CiviL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGns AND DEVELOPMENT OF NA-
TIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, 284-97 (1990).
15 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. The implementation of the Philadel-
phia Plan is discussed. Id.; Farber & Frickey, supra note 14, at 712-13. It is explained that
the Philadelphia Plan helped minorities by requiring contractors to increase recruitment of
minorities and women, establish goals and timetables for hiring underrepresented and pro-
mote female and minority candidates. Id.; see also Federal Affirmative Action Provisions,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 13, 1995, at A14. Affirmative action provisions based on race,
ethnicity or gender fall into three categories consisting of those that encourage diverse hir-
ing and contracting, those that set numerical goals and quotas and those that give prefer-
ences to members of various groups. Id.; Linda Feldman, Affirmative Action 101: What the
Lingo Means, CBIUSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25, 1995, at 3. A quota is a "rigid numerical
requirement, which is totally unresponsive to supply or merit." Id. The article defines
"goals and timetables" as federal programs that encourage specific participation by minori-
ties and women. Id. Moreover, a set-aside is similar to a quota. Id. While the term prefer-
ence has no formal meaning, it includes government programs structured to promote
greater minority and women's participation. Id.
16 See Ernesto V. Portillo, Is There A Democratic Process to Establish Equality?, TuSCON
CrrIzaN, June 21, 1995, at 7A. Thirty years ago our government was committed to end
violations of civil rights, but now Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on the legality of
programs enacted to achieve that goal. Id.; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25
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branches of government have collectively reversed the progress of
their predecessors by curtailing many forms of minority prefer-
ence programs. 17 In particular, recent Supreme Court opinions
have evidenced a bold activism in the Court's reexamination of its
position on affirmative action and other major social issues.'" The
Supreme Court implemented "strict scrutiny" as the applicable
level of review for all federal race-based preference programs, in
it's recent decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 19
This Note will analyze the future of affirmative action programs
within the constitutional framework promulgated by the Supreme
(1883). It is recognized that there must be some point in time when a black man takes the
rank of "mere citizen" and ceases being the "special favorite of the laws." Id.; Marcia Coyle,
An Emboldened Majority Breaks Ground: Although the Center Wavered, the Court's Rulings
Had a Big Effect on Race, Religion and Federalism, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at C2. Coyle
discussed the "conservative counter-revolution" created by the Rehnquist Court. Id.; Bruce
Fein, End in Sight for Racial Politics?, WASH. TMnxs, June 14, 1995, at A20. Fein suggested
that a conflict between the beneficial goals of affirmative action and American ideologies of
equality existed. Id. He felt that special preferences for minorities have dominated civil
rights for the entire adult lives of voters 18 to 40 years old and intimated that Americans
do not feel moral guilt over Jim Crow laws or the disgrace of Little Rock in 1958. Id. Fein
assessed that many Americans refuse to pay reparation to minorities who bear no scars
from historical discrimination. Id.; Herman Schwartz, Whose Affirmative Action? The Court
Ruling The Blind Spot in Strict Scrutiny, L.A. Tnms, June 18, 1995, at 1. The current wave
of conservatism in the Court can be analogized to post-Reconstruction conservatism of the
1880s. Id. During the 1880s, the nation was preoccupied with entry into the industrial age
and was tired of Reconstruction idealism, as evidenced by The Civil Rights Cases, and le-
gally sanctioned discrimination and repression of black Americans. Id. Today, many Ameri-
cans are tired of compensating for the mistakes of their forbearers. Id. At a time when
Americans are faced with economic insecurity, they are no longer concerned with racial
tensions. Id. See generally BENOKRArrIS & FEAGIN, supra note 4, at 7-24; FREDERICK R.
LYNCH, INvISIBLE VIcTIMs: WHITE MALES AND THE CISIS OF AFFIRMATIE AcTION 165-82
(1991). Lynch examines the use and effects of racial preferences in restructuring American
society. Id.
17 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) (ruling that
race-based preference programs are subject to strict scrutiny); Dole Aims at Affirmative
Action; Bill to End Federal, Racial and Gender Preferences Goes Beyond Court Ruling,
WASH. POST, July 28, 1995, at A10 (introducing Equal Opportunity Act of 1995 designed to
eliminate all forms of racial preferences); President Clinton's Remarks on Affirmative Ac-
tion at the National Archives, U.S. NEwswm, July 19, 1995 (indicating his support for
affirmative action and stating that some programs need to be analyzed to ensure that af-
firmative action is working in manner in which it was intended).
18 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 (1995) (holding that state uni-
versities cannot prohibit funding of religious publication when other student publications
receive funds and upholding direct funding to private religious activities for first time);
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2493 (1995) (holding that race cannot be primary factor
in drawing election district boundaries); Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995)
(making it substantially more difficult for prisoners to bring suits challenging conditions of
imprisonment); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (1995) (holding that federal
courts exceeded their authority in fashioning desegregation remedy); United States v. Lo-
pez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (holding that Gun-Free School Zone Act, making it federal
offense to knowingly possess firearm in school zone, exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause
authority because possession of firearm in local school zone was not economic activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce).
19 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995).
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Court in the Adarand decision. Part One will review Adarand
and focus on the new constitutional standard for race-based pref-
erence programs. The application of "strict scrutiny" to affirma-
tive action programs will be examined. Part Two will trace the
Supreme Court's activist trend and address the ramifications of
Adarand within the current political climate. The composition of
the Court and the political climate will effect the manner in which
the strict scrutiny standard is employed. Finally, Part Three will
discuss the future of affirmative action in the wake of Adarand.
Specific programs will be examined to illustrate programs that
can survive strict scrutiny. This Note will conclude that federal
affirmative action programs have the potential to survive strict
scrutiny if specific evidence of past discrimination is available and
the implemented remedy is sufficiently narrowly tailored to ad-
dress such instances of discrimination.
I. ADARN D CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA: STRICT SCRUTINY IS
THE NEW STANDARD FOR FEDERAL PREFERENCE PROGRAMS
The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act of 198720 ("STURAA") creates a framework under which gen-
eral contractors become eligible to receive monetary incentives for
hiring disadvantaged individuals.2 1 STURAA mandates that at
least ten percent of the funds appropriated for highway projects
shall be expended on small businesses owned and controlled by
individuals who are socially and economically disadvantaged.2 2
The statute presumes that women and minorities are disadvan-
20 Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 144 (1987).
21 Id. STURAA authorizes appropriations from the Highway Trust Fund by fiscal year
for qualified "disadvantaged business enterprises" ("DBE") of not less than 10% of appro-
priations. Id.
22 See id. STURRA adopts the Small Business Act's ("S.B.A.") definition of a "socially
and economically disadvantaged individual." Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1) (1988). The SBA ap-
plies to all federal procurement activities and requires the President to set an annual goal
of not less the five percent for small businesses owned and controlled by "socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals." Id. The statute further requires each agency to es-
tablish individual goals for its contracts. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5). The phrase "socially
disadvantaged individuals" means "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic preju-
dice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to
their individual qualities." Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6). Section 637 defines "economically dis-
advantaged individuals" as "those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to com-
pete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit
opportunities as compared to others in the same business who are not socially disadvan-
taged." Id.
1995]
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taged.2" Thus, if a prime contractor follows these guidelines by
awarding at least ten percent of its subcontracts to women or mi-
norities, it qualifies to receive cash bonuses from the federal
government.24
Adarand Constructors, Inc. ("Adarand"), a highway construction
company owned by a white male, specialized in the installation of
highway guardrail systems and highway signs.25 Although
Adarand submitted the low bid on a subcontract to build guard-
rails on a federal highway, the general contractor awarded the
subcontract to a minority-owned company.26 The general contrac-
tor received a $10,000 federally-funded cash bonus pursuant to
STURRA when it chose a disadvantaged minority-owned subcon-
tractor over the lowest bidder.2 7 Adarand subsequently filed suit
against federal officials,2" claiming that race-based presumptions
violate the Equal Protection Clause.29
23 See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(c). In accordance with SBA guidelines, "Black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or
any other individual found to be disadvantaged by the Administration pursuant to section
8(a) of the Small Business Act" are presumptively regarded as socially and economically
disadvantaged. Id.
24 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2103 (1995). 115 S. Ct. at 2103.
The Court noted that the Federal Construction Procurement Program is authorized by sec-
tion 644(g) of the SBA and is funded by section 106(a)(8) of the STURAA of 1987. Id. The
program requires the Department of Transportation to appropriate contract funds through
disadvantaged businesses under a clause entitled "Subcontracting Compensation Clause."
Id. at 2102-03. Compensation is available to a prime contractor under this clause when at
least 10% of the prime contract amount is expended on one or more disadvantaged subcon-
tractors. Id. at 2103.
25 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
26 See id. at 2101. The Adarand construction company was owned by a white male and
was not federally certified as a "small business controlled by 'socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals.'" Id.
27 See Petitioner's Brief at 11, Adarand (No. 93-1841). The Central Federal Lands High-
way Division solicited bids on August 10, 1989 for the construction of a 4.7 mile section of
highway at the San Juan National Forest (the West Dolores Project). Id. at 8. The Subcon-
tractors Compensation Clause ("SCC") was included in § 108 of the contract for the West
Dolores Project. Id. at 9. Under the SCC provision, the size of the bonus offered to the prime
contractor was equal to 10% of the final amount of the DBE subcontracts, not to exceed 2%
of the final prime contract amount. Id. at 10. In this case, the prime contractor was entitled
to compensation of approximately $10,000, 10% of the $104,800 subcontract price. Id.
28 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1992) (hold-
ing that STURAA did not violate Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and granting defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment), affd, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995).
29 See id. at 244; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id.; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall deprive any
person of life liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
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A. Federal Government Procurement Programs
Congress introduced federal construction procurement pro-
grams to overcome discriminatory contract awards which pre-
cluded companies owned by women and minorities from compet-
ing in the marketplace. 30  These federal programs were
implemented to combat decades of institutional discrimination
which prevented many minorities from establishing the political
and personal connections necessary to win contracts.3 1 Accord-
ingly, these federal programs aimed to "level the playing field" and
provide prior victims of professional discrimination an opportu-
nity to prove themselves. 32
B. Petitioner's Argument
Adarand argued that the use of race as a determining factor in
awarding federal construction procurement contracts violated the
30 See Small Business Problems: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small Business,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The issue of minority disadvantage in federal contracting
caused by racial discrimination has been examined repeatedly by Congress. Id. Consist-
ently, Congress has found that those disadvantages still exist. Id. Based on this knowledge,
the SBA has continued or expanded upon social disadvantage based on race. Id.; see also
Pub. L. No. 96-302, § 118, 94 Stat. 840 (1980); Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 18105, 100 Stat. 370 (1986); Business Opportunity
Development Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-656, §§ 101, 207, 102 Stat. 3853, 3861-62 (1988);
133 CONG. Ric. 33, 314-33, 315 (1987) (commenting on House Report No. 1807). When
Congress amended the SBA in 1988 to add the disadvantaged business enterprise goals, it
reaffirmed that the SBA's disadvantaged business contracting program is "the most signifi-
cant effort of the Federal Government to reduce the effects of discrimination in en-
trepreneurial endeavors." Id. The House Committee on Small Business specifically found
that "discrimination and the present effects of past discrimination" continue to hinder mi-
nority business development and that an increase in the effectiveness of the SBA was nec-
essary "to redress the effects of discrimination on entrepreneurial endeavors."
31 See H.R. REP. No. 460, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1987). The House Committee
Report concluded that the lack of minority participation in federal procurement was the
result of both present and past discrimination. Id.; Cindy Richards, Affirmative Action Has
Work to Do, CHi. SuN-Tiars, June 16, 1995, at 37. Since hiring is a risky process, "compa-
nies hire people they know, or people who have been recommended by people they know."
Id. This places minorities at a disadvantage because they have traditionally been unable to
make necessary business contacts. Id. Unless a company is "forced by law or motivated by
bonuses, they are not likely to look beyond their regular circle." Id. See generally Paul Brest
& Mirando Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 885, 861 n.43 (1995). A
commitment to affirmative action programs may counteract practices that have a disparate
impact on members of minority groups such as undue reliance on "old boy networks" for
information about applicants or appointments. Id.
32 See Richards, supra note 31, at 37. Richards reports that "[o]nce minorities and wo-
men are in the door, color and gender become irrelevant .... [i]f the company can't perform
satisfactorily, it won't get the next contract." Id. Affirmative action is designed to break
down the "old boy network" by widening the pool of qualified candidates and creating an
environment in which merit can prevail. Id. Minorities tend not to be part of the same
social circles as those who hire and provide capital, and therefore lack the connections nec-
essary to compete effectively for jobs and funding. Id.
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Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause.33 Adarand asserted that the equal protection analysis
of a federal law permitting race-based exclusions necessitated ju-
dicial review under the strict scrutiny standard34 to determine its
constitutionality.35 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held the law constitutional. 36 The Circuit Court re-
fused to apply the strict scrutiny standard, instead affirming the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado's applica-
33 Adarand Contructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2101 (1995); see United States v.
Paradise, 580 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (noting that Equal Protection component of Due
Process Clause of Fifth Amendment is coextensive with Fourteenth Amendment); Wein-
berger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (stating that equal protection analysis is
same under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (finding that Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment imposes same equal protec-
tion requirements on federal government as Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on state government).
34 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994) (explaining that
under strict scrutiny Court determines whether restriction is necessary to serve compelling
governmental interest and if it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end): Metro Broadcasting
v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3029 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that strict scrutiny
requires statute to be "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest" in
order to pass constitutional muster); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (stating that
strict scrutiny requires that there be compelling state interest to enact law and that it be
narrowly drawn to serve that purpose); Equality Found., Inc. v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 429 (S.D. Ohio, 1994) (explaining that there are three standards of constitutional re-
view used in equal protection analysis: rational basis standard, intermediate scrutiny and
strict scrutiny); cf Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (stating that under rational
basis review legislature need not articulate purpose or rationale supporting its classifica-
tion); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 145-46 (1938) (holding that under
rational basis test law will be upheld if"the classifications are rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose").
35 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(recognizing that "conventional" test for reviewing "governmental programs employing ra-
cial classifications" is strict scrutiny); accord Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1 (indicating that
strict scrutiny is necessary because discrimination and bias are so pervasive that skeptical
judicial monitoring is needed to ensure actions or laws are not governed by discrimination
and bias); see Petitioner's Brief at 24, Adarand (No. 93-1841) (arguing that Court tradition-
ally employed strict scrutiny in considering violations of equal protection component of Due
Process Clause of Fifth Amendment); see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486
(1995) (noting that statutes are subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis
not only when express racial classifications are utilized but also when, although seemingly
race neutral in language, it is motivated by racial purpose); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (stating that under strict scrutiny there must be convincing
evidence that remedial action is necessary before implementing affirmative action); Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (indicating that classifications
based on race are inherently suspect and trigger strict scrutiny review); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (requiring compelling governmental inter-
est to justify any state imposed burden based upon individual's race or ethnicity); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding legal restrictions based on racial
classification immediately subject to rigid scrutiny).
36 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1543 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that proper review of program was Fullilove standard resembling intermediate scrutiny
because federal government acting under congressional authority can engage more freely
in affirmative action than states and localities), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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tion of the "intermediate scrutiny" standard.37 The Supreme
Court vacated the lower courts' judgments and declared that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review in the equal pro-
tection analysis of federal laws addressing the issue of race.3
C. Government Classifications Under Equal Protection Analysis
Prior to Adarand, the Supreme Court had analyzed the applica-
ble standard of review for equal protection challenges to race-
based legislation on several occasions. 39 The Court's failure to em-
brace an applicable level of scrutiny in such cases as Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,4" Fullilove v. Klutznick,41 and
37 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D. Colo. 1992), affd, 16
F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). The district court claimed that
the program must demonstrate that it serves important governmental objectives and that
it is substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Id.; see Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Intermediate scrutiny requires that the challenged law serve an "im-
portant government objective." Id. This level of scrutiny is applied to gender discrimination
claims. Id.; Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3009. A classification will survive intermedi-
ate scrutiny when it serves an important governmental purpose and is substantially re-
lated to that purpose. Id.; Daniel Seligman, The Scrutinizers: U.S. Supreme Court Fails to
End Affirmative Action in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, FORTUNE, July 24, 1995, at
170. A program subject to strict scrutiny requires a "compelling government interest" to
pass muster under the Constitution's Equal Protection mandate, while intermediate scru-
tiny requires a "reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest." Id. The dif-
ference between compelling and legitimate is not always clear. Id. There is not a bright line
separating the definitions of these words. Id.
38 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995). Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion found that all racial classifications imposed by federal, state
or local government must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Id. To survive strict scrutiny,
an affirmative action program must serve a compelling governmental interest and be nar-
rowly tailored to redress specific and identifiable past discrimination. Id. Justice O'Connor
stated that any government program that classifies people according to race should be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny because of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection to all indi-
viduals. Id.; cf Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1537. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit up-
held the program by finding it has served a "significant governmental purpose of providing
subcontracting opportunities for small, disadvantaged business enterprises." Id.; James
Kilpatrick, Affirmative Action Ruling Lucidly Hazy, AusTN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, June
22, 1995, at A15. The author noted that significant governmental interest may not rise to
the level of compelling governmental interest. Id.
39 See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-70 (questioning whether school board could adopt
race-based preferences in determining which teachers to lay off); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491-
92 (upholding federal program requiring 10% of public works contracts to be awarded to
minority-controlled enterprises); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (holding that university's plan to
set aside 16 out of 100 seats for minority students too rigid although general concept of
giving special consideration to minorities acceptable). See generally JOHN E. NowAK & RON-
ALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITUTtoNAL LAw § 14 (4th ed. 1995) (detailing history and applica-
tion of Equal Protection Clause including challenges to race-based legislation).
4o 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that medical school's admission program which used race
as consideration violated Equal Protection Clause of United States Constitution).
41 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that Minority Business Enterprise provision did not vio-
late Equal Protection Clause of Constutition).
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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education42 left the appropriate con-
stitutional framework for reviewing remedial race-based govern-
mental legislation unresolved.4 3 The difficulty the Court exper-
ienced in determining the appropriate standard of review was first
apparent in Bakke.4 4 Bakke involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to an admission program at a state run medical school which
reserved a certain number of seats for minority students.4 5 Justice
Powell, in writing the plurality opinion for the Court, applied the
strict scrutiny standard of review and concluded that the medical
school's admission program violated the Equal Protection
Clause.46 Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, found it un-
necessary to analyze the program under constitutional review be-
cause they believed the admissions program violated Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.41 In contrast, Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun and White, agreed that such a program should be
subjected to constitutional evaluation but argued that an interme-
diate level of scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.48
Although the Bakke decision failed to produce a majority opinion
for the Court, it did conclude that race-based governmental pro-
grams must be subject to some level of constitutional evaluation,49
however, left the question of the appropriate level of review
unanswered.
42 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that school board's use of racial preferences violated the
Equal Protection Clause of Constitution).
43 See Christopher S. Miller, The End Justifies the Means: Affirmative Action, Standards
of Review, and Justice White, 46 U. Mixmi L. REV. 1305, 1306, 1324 n.7 (1992) (explaining
different standards adopted by Justices in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant); Solomon Oliver,
Jr., Litigating the Constitutionality of State and Local Affirmative Action Plans: Issues and
Approaches, 10 REV. LrrlG. 55, 56-57 (1990) (noting inability of Justices to agree on appro-
priate standard of review for affirmative action programs in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant);
Rocco Potenza, Affirmative Action: Will Justice O'Connor Author Its End, 22 U. TOL. L.
REv. 805, 805 (1991) (recognizing that Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant were all plurality deci-
sions in which Court failed to establish appropriate standard of review); Adam Winkler,
Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 923,
944 (1995) (stating that Court has wavered between standards of review in affirmative
action cases since Bakke); Sally Morris, Comment, One More Battle on the Ongoing War
Over Affirmative Action: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 921, 922
(1992) (indicating dispute over standard of review in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant).
44 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
45 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-70 (1978).
46 See id. at 270-71.
47 See id. at 411-18.
48 See id. at 411-12.
49 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
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Two years later in Fullilove, the Court had the opportunity to
answer this question when it was presented with an equal protec-
tion challenge to a federal statute requiring that at least ten per-
cent of federal fxmds granted for federal works projects be set
aside for minority owned businesses.50 With facts similar to
Adarand, the Fullilove Court held that the statute was constitu-
tional but again failed to agree on the applicable test to analyze
the constitutionality of a remedial race-based governmental pro-
gram.5 Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion, in which Justices
White and Powell joined, outlined a two-part test which examined:
(1) whether the objectives of the statute were within the power of
Congress; and (2) whether the use of racial criteria was a constitu-
tionally permissive means of achieving that congressional objec-
tive.5 2 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, followed his posi-
tion in Bakke and again advocated the application of strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications.53 In analyzing Chief Justice
Burger's rationale, Justice Powell posited that the plurality opin-
ion had essentially imposed a strict scrutiny standard of review.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, adopted Justice Powell's position, but concluded that the
strict scrutiny test had not been satisfied and maintained that the
statute was unconstitutional. 55 Justice Marshall, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment but es-
poused that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate level of re-
view. 56 After Fullilove, it was clear that the Supreme Court was
still divided on the appropriate level of scrutiny to be afforded to
government racial classifications. 7
50 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980).
51 See id. at 491-92.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 496.
54 See id. at 496.
55 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-23 (1980).
56 See id. at 519.
57 See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 487 (1989) (recognizing that Fullilove did not
employ any traditional standard of equal protection review); see also Martha J. Hess, Con-
stitutional Law-Equal Protection-Benign Classifications Based on Race Must Be Nar-
rowly Tailored to Achieve a Compelling Governmental Interest, 21 ST. MAS'S L.J. 493, 498-
99 (1989) (stating that Fullilove did not adopt level of scrutiny when it upheld minority set-
aside plan), Miller, supra note 43, at 1312 (noting that Fullilove did not endorse any consti-
tutional standard of review); John Payton, The Meaning and Significance of the Croson
Case, 1 GEO. MASON U. Crv. RTS. L.J. 59,61 (1990) (explaining that Fullilove court failed to
employ any standard of equal protection review).
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The Supreme Court continued to struggle with this question in
Wygant.51 In Wygant, the Court was presented with an equal pro-
tection challenge to a school board policy which considered race as
a factor in determining which teachers to lay off.59  Justice Pow-
ell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, applied the strict scrutiny test in the plurality opinion
of the Court. ° In analyzing whether the plan served a compelling
government interest and whether or not it was narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest, Justice Powell concluded that the Jackson
Board of Education had not demonstrated a sufficiently compel-
ling governmental interest and struck down the plan as violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 1 Justices
O'Connor and White concurred, agreeing with the judgment, but
disagreeing with the rationale.2 Justice Marshall dissented,
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, again arguing that in-
termediate scrutiny was the appropriate level of review.63 After
three opportunities the Supreme Court failed to articulate a con-
trolling standard of review for race-based preference programs.
In 1989, however, a majority of the Court resolved this issue as
it related to state legislation enacted to remedy prior racial dis-
crimination.6 4 In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,65 a municipal stat-
ute required that thirty percent of its contracting work be
awarded to minority-owned businesses. 66 When the statute was
58 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 267 (1986).
59 See id.
60 See id. at 274-78.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 286-89, 295.
63 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301-03 (1986).
64 See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny and
noting that standard's usefulness to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race).
65 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
6 See id. at 477-78. The Richmond City Council enacted the Minority Business Act
which required prime contractors contracting with the City to subcontract at least 30% of
the amount of the prime contract to a Minority Business Enterprise ("MBE"). Id. at 477. A
business which was 51% owned and controlled by minority group members was considered
an appropriate MBE under the Plan. Id. Minority group members were defined as United
States citizens who are Black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut. Id. at
478. The City Council adopted the Plan after sufficient evidence of past discrimination
within the construction industry was brought to their attention. Id. at 479-80. The Council
reviewed a study indicating that from 1978 through 1983 only .067% of the City's prime
construction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses, listened to testimony by
the former mayor that the local construction industry is widespread with race discrimina-
tion and exclusion, and received evidence that the major construction trade associations in
Richmond had virtually no minority members. Id. The City Council also relied on the find-
ings of nationwide discrimination within the construction industry on which the Supreme
Court predicated its decision in Fullilove. Id.
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challenged, the Court held that the standard of review for all ra-
cial classifications by municipal government was strict scrutiny.67
In Croson, the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause required that race-based action by state
and local governments be subject to strict scrutiny.68 The Croson
Court also noted, in dicta, that it had no authority, based on the
facts presented, to declare the appropriate standard of review
under a Fifth Amendment analysis of race-based action taken by
the federal government.69
D. Adarand Requires Strict Scrutiny
In Adarand, the Court, for the first time, formed a 5-4 majority
which refused to uphold a federal affirmative action policy. 70 Jus-
tice O'Connor's majority opinion held that the federal government
may not give special preferences to minority businesses when
awarding contracts, unless the program passes "strict scrutiny.""
Strict scrutiny requires that the program (1) be implemented to
67 See id. at 493-94. "[Tlhe standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification." Id. at
494; see also Excerpts; The Supreme Court on Affirmative Action, COURIER J. (Louisville),
June 14, 1995, at 7A. This article indicated that the Metro Broadcasting opinion was au-
thored by Justice Brennan, a longtime liberal warhorse on the Court, on eve of his retire-
ment. Id.; Linda Greenhouse, Affirmative Action Fate Lies with Politics, Not Court, NEws
AND OBSERVER (Raleigh), June 14, 1995, at Al. Greenhouse noted that the 5-4 ruling in
Metro Broadcasting "was a product of former Justice Brennan's ability to accomplish lib-
eral results long after he had a liberal Court to work with." Id. But see Metro Broadcasting
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-566 (1990) (holding that "benign" federal racial classifications
need only to satisfy intermediate scrutiny in analyzing Fifth Amendment challenge to two
race-based policies of FCC), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995).
68 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504; cf id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I do not agree with
... Justice O'Connor's dicta, suggesting that, despite the Fourteenth Amendment, state
and local governments may in some circumstances discriminate on the basis of race in
order . . . 'to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination.'").
69 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110; City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 484-85
(1989). In deciding Croson, the Court had to address Fullilove which was controlling prece-
dent. Id. In order for the Court to hold the Plan in Croson unconstitutional, the Court had
to either overrule Fullilove or had to distinguish it from the facts in Croson. Id. Justice
O'Connor chose the latter and held that federal racial classifications such as the program in
Fullilove should not be subject to strict scrutiny because the federal government has broad
remedial powers. Id. In contrast, Justice O'Connor reasoned that state and local govern-
ments have no "specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 490. Thus, she concluded that a more stringent review must be given
to racial classifications employed by state and local governments. Id.; cf id. at 518 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (stating "the process by which a law that is an equal protection viola-
tion when enacted by a state becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee when
enacted by Congress poses a difficult question for me").
70 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
71 See id. at 2112-13.
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achieve a compelling governmental interest and (2) be narrowly
tailored in its method of achieving that interest.7 2 The opinion
enunciated the view that racial classifications are unfair, even if
designed to benefit a previously disadvantaged group.73 The Court
stated that all racial classifications, including those in federal pro-
grams, are inherently suspect and presumptively invalid. 4
In a crucial passage of the opinion, however, Justice O'Connor
intimated that strict scrutiny would not unilaterally defeat pro-
grams that extend preferences based on race.7 5 Although Adarand
restricted affirmative action programs, it did not completely elimi-
nate their use.76 Rather, the decision provided constitutional au-
thority for certain preference programs that provide detailed evi-
dence of past discrimination and prove that such racial
72 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 St. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995). "[S]uch classifi-
cations are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compel-
ling governmental interests." Id. at 2113. But see id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Stevens noted that "SBA and STURRA embody Congress' recognition that such
barriers may actually handicap minority firms seeking business as subcontractors from
established leaders in the industry that have a history of doing business with their golfing
partners". Id.
73 See id. at 2112; see also Shaw v. Reno 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2818 (1993) (discussing that
"racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society [by] reinforcing
the belief.., that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin); Metro Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that departure from strict scrutiny in determining constitutionality of
racial classifications "marks a renewed toleration of racial classifications and a repudiation
of our recent affirmation that the constitution's equal protection guarantees extend equally
to all citizens"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (suggesting Court is presumptively skeptical of all
racial classifications); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276-77 (1986) (stating
that "history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to
legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity have [sic] no place in equal protection
analysis"); Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 485 (1987) (arguing that good
intentions insufficient to validate government set-asides that employ "explicit racial classi-
fication system[s]").
74 See Adarand 115 S. Ct. at 2104-14 (holding that all racial classifications, imposed by
either federal, state or local government must be analyzed by reviewing court under strict
scrutiny); supra note 34 (discussing strict scrutiny standard).
75 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117. Justice O'Connor stated that the Court wished to
"dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory but fatal in fact." Id. She acknowl-
edged the "persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minorities in this country" and expressed that "the government is not disqualified
from acting in response to it." Id. Justice O'Connor referred to United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987), as an example of the permissive governmental response to dis-
crimination. Id. She explained that "[als recently as 1987 .. .every Justice of this Court
agreed that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's 'pervasive, systematic and obsti-
nate discriminatory conduct' justified a narrowly tailored race-based remedy." Id. Justice
O'Connor further concluded that "[wihen race-based action is necessary to further a com-
pelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow
tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases." Id.
76 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (discussing that Justice O'Connor expressly indicated
that programs would not be "fatal in fact" and would allow governmental response to racial
discrimination).
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preferences represent a "narrowly tailored" remedy.77 To prove
that a remedy is narrowly tailored, the program must be confined
to a specific time period and be imposed as a last resort, after all
other solutions have been exhausted.78 Such a high threshold of
review inevitably will have a significant impact on federal affirma-
tive action policies. 79 Although Adarand is not fatal in fact to af-
firmative action, it may cripple many federal programs which do
not meet the new constitutional standard.8 0
77 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117-18 (1995); Bennett v.
Arrington, 20 F.3d 1525, 1647-48 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that flexibility and duration of
city's affirmative action plan which included race-based promotional system for fire depart-
ment was not narrowly tailored); H.K. Porter Company, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
975 F.2d 762, 766-67 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that county's minority set aside program
was not narrowly tailored because county did not investigate or have knowledge of earlier
discrimination in industry); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d. 420,
424-25 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (declaring Act unconstitutional because there was no evidence that
white contractors had been favored over non-whites, set-aside goal was not linked to any
racial discrimination in construction industry, and no evidence existed of past discrimina-
tion against groups which were defined as minorities under Act); Shurberg Broadcasting of
Hartford, Inc., v. FCC, 876 F.2d. 902, 938-53 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that FCC's distress
sale program favoring minority-owned purchasers was not narrowly tailored to remedy
past discrimination or to promote program diversity in that it was not reasonably related to
interest it sought to vindicate); Martin v. School Dist. of Phil., No. CIV.A.95-5650, 1995 WL
564344, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1995) (finding that policy requiring transfer of 35% to
65% of students to another school district was not narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interest); American Subcontractors Assoc., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 376 S.E.2d 662,
666-67 (1989) (noting that testimony of witnesses acknowledging problems with minority
participation could be ameliorated by alternate remedies and implementation of quota sys-
tem for minority participation demonstrated lack of narrow tailoring); cf Cone Corp. v.
Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 913 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that plan contained suffi-
cient procedural safeguards to be considered narrowly tailored); Alexander v. Prince
George's County, Nos. CIV. AW-93-2636, CIV. AW-94-2030, 1995 WL 603297, at *9-10 (D.
Md. Oct. 11, 1995) (finding fire department's affirmative action narrowly tailored in that
alternate remedies were unsuccessful, it was of limited duration, it was designed to remedy
present imbalances resulting from past discrimination, it was flexible, and it did not have
severe impact on third parties); Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., No. Civ.A.89-T-196-
N, 1995 WL 494913, at *29 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 1995) (determining that goals for black
women were not overinclusive but were slightly underinclusive to be sufficiently narrowly
tailored); Association of General Contractors, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp.
1443, 1455-56 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding plan was narrowly tailored because it attempted
race-neutral remedy and avoided use of rigid quotas).
78 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. The Court stated that when reviewing race-based
programs a court must consider: (1) "whether there was any consideration of the use of
race-neutral means to increase minority business participation;" and (2) "whether the pro-
gram was appropriately limited such that it will not last longer than the discriminating
effects it is designed to eliminate." Id.
79 Compare David G. Savage, Rebuilding Affirmative Action, 81, A.B.A. J. 42, 46 (1995)
(arguing that recent strict scrutiny fatalities indicate future of affirmative action) with
Ralph Thomas, Is This The End of Minority Contracting? Not Hardly.. ., 42 FED. LAw. 34,
38 (1995) (arguing that Adarand's new guidelines will make federal minority contracting
stronger than before).
80 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating
that "W[the failure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has led some to wonder
whether our review of racial classifications has been strict in theory but fatal in fact");
Gunther, supra, note 1, at 8 (suggesting that statutes are rarely sustained under strict
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An important aspect of the Adarand ruling is that the Court
upheld the legitimacy of affirmative action and rejected explicit
efforts by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas to elimi-
nate all race-based remedies for discrimination."1 While both Jus-
tices joined the majority opinion, each would have declined to jus-
tify any affirmative action programs.8 2 Both Justices contended
that the Constitution is colorblind and, as such, all race-based dis-
tinctions are invalid.83 Even though the majority refused to go
scrutiny because strict scrutiny review is "strict in theory but usually fatal in fact"); Lisa A.
Montanano, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the Court Get the Hint?
Congress' Attempts to Raise Status of Persons with Disabilities in Equal Protection Cases,
15 PACE L. REv. 621, 631 (1995) (noting that statutes rarely survive strict scrutiny analy-
sis); Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1 (suggesting that few measures can pass threshold test of
strict scrutiny). But see Adarand, 115 U.S. at 2100 (suggesting that "[ilt is not true that
strict scrutiny is strict in theory and fatal in fact"); supra note 75 and accompanying text
(explaining majority decision left opening for governmental response to racial
discrimination).
81 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that
government can never justify racial preferences to compensate for past racial discrimina-
tion because under our constitution "there can be no such thing as creditor or debtor race."
Id.; id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas expressed his view that affirma-
tive action is a form of"racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poi-
sonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination." Id. He further noted that all
racial distinctions are prohibited by the Constitution because "government sponsored racial
discrimination is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice" noting
a "moral and constitutional equivalence between laws designed to subjugate a race and
those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster equality." Id.
82 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118-19 (1995) (discussing
Justices Scalia and Thomas' view enunciated in Adarand that all race-based distinctions
should be eliminated).
83 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]n the eyes of
the government we are only one race"); id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating
that "[ulnder our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of
race"); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520, 524 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that "the benign purpose of compensating for social disadvantages,
whether they have been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise, can no
more be persuaded by the illegitimate means of racial discrimination... [when] we depart
from race-neutral programs we play with fire and more than an occasional . . .Croson
burns"); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indi-
cating that racist principles breed racist results and that minority group members who
have overcome racial stereotypes are hurt by lower standards of affirmative action pro-
grams); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan., J., dissenting) (stating that
"there is no caste system here, our Constitution is colorblind and neither knows nor toler-
ates classes among citizens"); Antonin Scalia, Commentary: The Disease as Cure, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 157 (1979) (indicating he is "opposed to racial affirmative action for
reasons of both principle and practicality" believing that accepting or rejecting people on
basis of their race is wholly unacceptable); Clarence Thomas, Toward a 'Plain Reading" of
the Constitution-The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30
How. L.J. 983, 992 (1987) (explaining history of colorblind principles in Supreme Court
jurisprudence). But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that "we cannot... let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that
many 'created equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and
by their fellow citizens"); Associate Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 16 (1st
Cir. 1973) (suggesting that '[tihe observation that the Constitution is colorblind represents
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that far, the Court, nevertheless, expressly overruled Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC,84 a 1990 decision which upheld two federal
race-based policies against a Fifth Amendment challenge.8 5
Why did the Court reverse its viewpoint on affirmative action?
The addition of Justice Clarence Thomas to the Court seemed to
create a cohesive majority, making the difference in the outcome
of the case.8 6 Since the Court last addressed the issue, Justice
Thurgood Marshall,8 7 the legendary civil rights lawyer and lead-
ing liberal on the Court, had retired and Justice Thomas, a
staunch conservative, was appointed to take his seat.8 With
Thomas supplying the fifth vote necessary to form a majority, the
a long-term goal, and it is by now understood that our society cannot be completely color-
blind in the short term if we are to have a colorblind society in the longterm"); John E.
Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality: Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirm-
ative Action, 79 IowA L. REV. 313, 316-24 (1994) (indicating that Justice Scalia is opponent
of affirmative action programs and positing that colorblind policies reflect desire to avoid
painful past and failure to acknowledge motivation behind race-based programs).
84 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
85 Id. at 3027-28.
86 See Margaret Carlson, Marching to a Different Drummer: By Choosing Clarence
Thomas, Who Says Integration Is An Impossible Dream, Bush Sparks Debate over the Goals
of the Civil Rights Movement, Tam, July 15, 1991, at 18 (quoting Thomas' opposition to
programs that force people to hire a certain percentage of minorities); Yxta M. Murray, The
Cultural Implications of Judicial Selection, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 374, 385 (1994) (indicating
that Justice Thomas' conservative viewpoints are adequately demonstrated as he has con-
sistently argued against affirmative action and abortion); K.G. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Ac-
tion, In Search of a National Policy, 2 TEM:P. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1992) (recog-
nizing that appointment of several conservative justices, including Justice Thomas, have
initiated intense political debate over fairness of affirmative action with proponents of such
policies on losing side); Gary Simson, Thomas's Supreme Unfitness-A Letter to the Senate
on Advice and Consent, 78 CORmLL L. REV. 619, 621 (1992) (discussing that it was Thomas'
staunch opposition to affirmative action that became his "calling card" among conservative
Republicans).
87 See generally MICHAEL D. DAVIS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL
ON THE BENCH (Carol Publication Group 1992) (detailing advocacy of Justice Thurgood
Marshall); ROGER L. GOLDMAN, TUmRGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL (Carroll & Graf
1992) (discussing Justice Marshall's support for minorities while on bench); DEBRA HESS,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: CHANGING THE LEGAL SYSTEM (Silver Burdett Press 1990) (expres-
sing effect of Justice Marshall on legal system); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS
LAw: THURGoOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (Oxford University Press
1994) (explaining significance of Justice Marshall in Civil Rights movement).
8 See Michael Comiskey, The Rehnquist Court and American Values, 77 JUDICATURE
261, 263 (1994) (noting that Court appears less receptive to affirmative action since Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall were replaced by more conservative Justices, David Souter
and Clarence Thomas); Cecil A. Rhodes, The Victim Impact Statement and Capital Crimes:
Trial By Jury and Death By Character, 21 S.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1994) (suggesting that Clar-
ence Thomas is "the antithesis of all that [Justice] Marshall had advocated politically and
judicially", in that Thomas is by far most conservative justice, and that his appointment
"epitomized the stereotypical negative affirmative action backlash which conservatives...
had espoused").
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Court reversed course and criticized preferential programs based
on race.
8 9
II. THE CONSERVATivE TRED OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. Judicial Movement to the Right
The United States Supreme Court ended its 1994-95 term with
the emergence of a solid conservative majority.90 Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy
formed a cohesive voting bloc which actively re-examined basic
constitutional principles in the most controversial cases of the
89 See Dan Freedman, Court Drops Race Bomb, Affirmative Action Dealt Blow, Justices
Stop Short of Scrapping Federal Programs, Say They May Violate Equal Protection, S.F.
EXAMINER, June 12, 1995, at Al (suggesting that key vote in Adarand was that of Justice
Thomas); Dan Freedman, Thomas Vote Turns Supreme Court's Tide, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
June 14, 1995, at 9A (noting that Justice Thomas was the crucial fifth vote needed to form
conservative majority); David S. Savage, High Court Deals Severe Blow To Federal Affirm-
ative Action Rights: Justices Hold That Race-Based Preferential Treatment Is Almost Al-
ways Unconstitutional But An Opening Is Left For Narrow Specific Bias Remedies, L.A.
TaEs, June 13, 1995, at 1 (noting that with Justice Thomas casting fifth vote in Adarand,
Court attempted to eliminate preferential race-based programs and dramatically reversed
course); David S. Savage, Supreme Court Takes U-Turn On Affirmative Action, TIE BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, June 13, 1995, at IA (stating that Justice Thomas cast deciding vote);
Jim Tranquada, High Court Puts Limits on Affirmative Action, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June 13,
1995, at N1 (suggesting that Justice Thomas provided crucial vote).
90 See Derrick Bell, Black History And America's Future, 29 VAL.. U. L. REv., 1179, 1181
(1995) (indicating that conservative Court majority attempted to dismantle decades of lib-
eral victories); Michael K. Braswell et al., Affirmative Action: An Assessment Of Its Contin-
uing Role in Employment Discrimination, 57 ALB. L. REV. 365, 365 (1993) (stating that
conservative Supreme Court majority of Supreme Court appears to be on course to limit
Affirmative Action as component of antidiscrimination policy); John A. Powell, An Agenda
For Post Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. Rxv. 889, 901 (1995) (suggesting that President and
Congress adhering to Court's colorblind principles have started reexamining affirmative
action policies); John J. Ross, The Employment Year In Review, 527 PRACTICine L. INSTrr.
7, *26 (1995) (noting that conclusion of 1994-95 Supreme Court term indicated five justice
conservative bloc which sent message that it is time to put race aside); Richard Carelli,
Conservative Bloc Steers High Court Politically Charged Decisions Of Term Reflect Shift To
Right, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield), July 2, 1995, at 6 (noting that five member majority
emerged in most politically charged cases of term deepening Court's ideological fault line);
Richard Carelli, Supreme Court Veers To Right in Radical Rulings, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
July 2, 1995, at A9 (recognizing conservative shift of 1994-95 Court in decisions on affirma-
tive action, voting rights, school desegregation, religion and privacy); Conservative Majority
Takes Shape On Supreme Court in the Post Term a Bloc of 5 Justices Shoved the Court the
Farthest to the Right That It Had Been in the Past 40 Years, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 2,
1995, at Al (suggesting that Court's 1994-95 term was its most conservative in 40 years;
five conservative justices were able to form majority bloc which controlled politically
charged cases); Jan Crawford, Court Sets Affirmative Action Limits The U.S. Supreme
Court Addresses Desegregation And Affirmative Action in Decisions That Redefine Its Atti-
tude Toward Programs Designed To Address Racial Inequality, CI. TamuNE, June 13,
1995, at 1 (illustrating that Adarand was able to command solid majority of Court's con-
servative bloc unlike previous cases regarding racial preferences).
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term.9 ' The Court's recent decisions illustrate a conservative ac-
tivism not enunciated by the Court since the Lochner92 era when
it threatened the New Deal legislation.93 For example, in the past
term, the Court not only ruled against minority preference pro-
grams in Adarand, but also struck down a black majority voting
district 94 and rejected a Kansas City school desegregation plan.95
91 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522-23 (1995) (permitting allocation
of public funds for private religious activities); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485-86
(1995) (determining that race cannot be primary factor in drawing election boundaries);
Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-301 (1995) (creating more stringent standard for
prisoner suits challenging prison conditions); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2040-41
(1995) (holding that Court of Appeals had exceeded its authority in creating desegregation
remedy); Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) (limiting congressional power
to regulate activities that incidentally affect interstate commerce).
92 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding labor law providing that no
employees shall be permitted to work more then 60 hours per qeek in bakery is not legiti-
mate exercise of state's police power); see Patricia A. Carlson, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena: The Lochnerization of Affirmative Action, 27 ST. MARY's L.J. 423, 445-56 (1996) (de-
picting Adarand decision as "Lochner era revisited"); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Juris-
prudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 100-11 (1991) (sug-
gesting that Lochner era was transitional period in Supreme Court history). David
Berstein, Note, The Supreme Court and "Civil Rights," 1886-1908, 100 YALE L.J. 725, 729-
31 (1990) (noting Lochner era and its impact on Supreme Court jurisprudence).
93 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288, 297, 310 (1936). The Court held that
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 was unconstitutional and an invalid use of
the Commerce Clause. Id.; Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542, 550
(1935). The National Industrial Recovery Act as applied to the petitioner was held to be
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because poultry was considered neither in
nor affecting the current of commerce. Id.; GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrruTIONAL LAw 122-24
(12th ed. 1991). As a result of these Supreme Court decisions, President Roosevelt at-
tempted to implement a "Court packing Plan." Id. President Roosevelt sought Congres-
sional authority to appoint an additional federal judge for each judge who was 70 years old
and had served on the Court for at least 10 years. Id. The Plan would be applied to all
levels of the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court. Id. The Plan was defeated by
Congress. Id.; JUDICIARY Comm. REPORT, June 14, 1937. Members opposed to the legislation
contended that in practical operation the Constitution would then be whatever the execu-
tive or legislative branches of the Government deemed it to be, an interpretation which
would be changed with each administration. Id.; see also Affirmative Action Rules Scaled
Back, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington), June 13, 1995, at Al. This article noted the breadth of
the Court's ruling in the Adarand decision. Id.; Joan Biskupic, Court's Conservatives Make
Presence Felt; Reagan Appointees Lead Rightward, WASH. PosT, July 2, 1995, at Al. A
sharp division existed among the justices this term. Id. One-third of the 82 signed opinions
were decided by 5-4 votes. Id. The conservative bloc prevailed in the six most significant
cases of the term deciding issues on affirmative action, voting districts, school desegrega-
tion, religious rights, congressional power and prisoner's rights. Id. Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia and Thomas voted similarly in 25 out of the 49 non-unanimous cases, Justice Ken-
nedy joined them in 24 of those cases and Justice O'Connor joined them in 20. Id. Justices
Scalia and Thomas voted together 90% of the time, Justices Ginsberg and Stevens, 80% of
the time. Id. The Justices voting together least often were Thomas and Stevens who agreed
only 47% of the time. Id.
94 See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490 (determining that redistricting plan enabling increase in
minority representation in Congress by creating congressional districts comprised of either
Black or Hispanic majorities, was unconstitutional).
95 See Missouri, 115 S. Ct. at 2040-41 (determining that school desegregation plan was
unconstitutional).
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Moreover, the judicial appointees9 6 of Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George Bush conveyed an intent to put race aside and make
the law colorblind. 97
The shift of the balance of power on the Court towards the con-
servative right has been a gradual process and has been traced by
scholars for some time.98 Indeed, during the past few years the
Court has indicated its proclivity to embrace a conservative phi-
losophy in interpreting the law.99 Shaw v. Reno'00 is an example
of this trend."' In 1993, the Court refused to uphold a congres-
96 See Affirmative Action Gets Squeezed Supreme Court Orders Stricter Standards, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, June 13, 1995, at Al (indicating that Supreme Court decisions are being
dominated by conservative justices appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush); Biskupic,
supra note 93, at Al (noting that current composition of Court is what Reagan actively
sought when making appointments); Tony Mauro, Court Signals 'End For Era' In Civil
Rights, USA TODAY, June 13, 1995, at Al (recognizing that Court's dramatic conservative
shift was clear legacy of Reagan-Bush era with overturning of civil rights victories); David
O'Brien, Nation, The Supreme Court on Race-Rehnquist's Been Waiting 40 Years, L.A.
Trmts, July 2, 1995, at 2 (discussing that Justice Rehnquist can rely on support from Jus-
tices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, appointees from Reagan and Bush pre-
sidencies); Roberto Rodriguez & Patrisia Gonzales, Supreme Court Rulings Damage Re-
spect for Law, CHi. SuN TIMEs, July 20, 1995, at 31 (suggesting that efforts of Presidents
Reagan and Bush to form cohesive conservative majority on Court are now being recog-
nized with overturning of civil rights victories); Chet Whye, Jr.. If Thomas and O'Connor
Aren't Quota Picks, Then Who?, DENV. POST, June 16, 1995, at B7 (noting Reagan and
Bush's conservative impact on the recent swing of Court).
97 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think
and Talk About Race Again, 15 B.C. THmD WORLD L.J. 1, 6 (1995). Lawrence suggests that
the Justices of Court are blinded to existence of racism. Id. In so doing, he asserts three
responses given by the Justices when the reality of racism is brought to their attention. Id.
The Justices may respond by saying "this is not evidence" (referring to Justice O'Connor's
Croson opinion asserting that City's justification of set-asides is based on "amorphous" and
"unsupported" assertion of "societal discrimination"). Id. However, it is possible that the
Justices may decide that "this is economics, not race" (referring to majority opinion in
Croson suggesting that race-neutral economic barriers were real problem, not discrimina-
tion). Id. The third possibility is that the Justices may conclude that "this is protected
racist speech, not conduct" (referring to R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2548-50 (1992)
where Court held that crossburning is a protected form of political speech). Id. The final
response would be "it is not racism when white contractors hire their friends and their
friends just happen to be white" (referring to Croson stating that evidence of minority
membership in local contractor's associations was not probative of any discrimination). Id.
And then the Justices further deny the existence of racism by claiming "you must be a
racist if you don't believe we are a colorblind society." Id.; Carlos J. Nan, Adding Salt to the
Wound: Affirmative Action and Critical Race Theory, 12 LAw & INEQUALITY 553, 561 (1994).
In examining Court's affirmative action decisions, this article concluded that such pro-
grams illustrate Court's attempt to create a colorblind Constitution by the implementation
of colorblind reasoning Id.
98 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993) (illustrating Court's conservative anal-
ysis); see also Richard A. Brisbin Jr. & Jon C. Kilwein, U.S. Supreme Court Review of State
High Court Decisions, 78 JUmCATURE 33, 40 (1994) (noting conservative trend of Supreme
Court in recent terms particularly with Court's review of state high court decisions).
99 See Brisbin & Kilwein, supra note 98, at 40 (indicating recent conservative trend of
Court).
100 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
101 See id. at 2832 (providing earlier example of Court's conservative trend).
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sional redistricting plan which would increase the possibility of
minority representation in Congress by creating two majority-
black voting districts. 10 2 In so doing, the Court refused to follow
its holding in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh Inc.
v. Carey10 3 where the Court upheld a similar redistricting plan.'1 4
The Court in Carey held that the plan favoring minority voters
was constitutional and not considered discriminatory as long as it
did not promote proportional underrepresentation of white vot-
ers.10 5 In Shaw, however, the Court expressly distinguished Carey
and declared that racial classifications threaten to incite hostility
and to stigmatize people by reason of their membership in a racial
group. 10 6 Thus, the Court concluded that if race was a predomi-
nant factor in drawing congressional district lines, the districting
scheme will be subject to strict scrutiny.10 7 The case was re-
manded back to the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada to be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis. 0 8 The
holding in Shaw offered clear evidence that the Court did not in-
tend to uphold any racial classification unless it was narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling governmental interest. 0 9 The Shaw
holding was indicative of the Court's restrictive trend and fore-
shadowed what was to come in Adarand."
These latest constitutional interpretations by the Supreme
Court are markedly different from those developed during the
1960s, '70s and early '80s when the Court legitimized programs
designed to furnish opportunities for minorities and women."' In
102 See id.
103 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
104 See id. at 165-68.
105 See id.
106 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824-28 (1973).
107 See id. at 2832.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 Compare Shaw, 113 S. Ct. 2816 with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2097 (1995).
11l See William N. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/Presi-
dent Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 616 (1991) (indicating activism of Supreme
Court in response to civil rights during Warren and Burger eras); Alan Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest For Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 295, 298-300, 304-05 (1988) (suggesting Supreme Court displayed commitment
to Civil Rights Movement); Richard L. Fricker, The Warren Court: A Retrospective, 22 HuM.
RTs. 46, 46 (1995) (describing the Warren Court as "rip[ping] civil rights out of law books
and placing them firmly into the consciousness of American society"); Michael B. Mushlin,
Unsafe Havens, the Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and
Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199, 219 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court's receptive
approach to civil rights); John E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for
1995]
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its former support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court used
its institutional prestige as an instrument for social change to de-
fend and validate many civil rights programs. 112 Indeed, the Court
under Chief Justice Warren Burger approved minority prefer-
ences in training programs and subcontracting for minority-
owned businesses, and encouraged the targeted hiring and promo-
tion of minorities and women as a remedy for past discrimina-
tion.113 As a result, generations of minorities and women have en-
tered fields of employment that were previously closed to them.1" 4
The Rehnquist Court, in its current quest for a colorblind Con-
stitution, has abandoned the undertakings of Chief Justices War-
ren and Burger, effectively denying that races are not yet treated
equally. 1 5 This sharp turn to the right may be attributed to Jus-
Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 349 (1995) (noting that dramatic action
taken by Court with regard to civil rights through mid 1980s has transformed into re-
stricted efforts to help racial minorities); Isabelle K. Pinzler, The Legislative Response, 7
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 123, 123 (1990) (stating that from time of Brown v. Board of
Educ. to middle of 1980s civil rights advocates were accustomed to looking to Supreme
Court in their struggle for civil rights as well as women's rights); Henry J. Reske, The
Diverse Legacy of Warren Burger, 81 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (1995) (suggesting that Burger Court
went even further than liberal Warren Court in protecting civil rights).
112 See generally supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing that Supreme
Court was instrumental in advancing Civil Rights movement).
113 See, e.g., Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479-82 (1986)
(holding that federal court may order hiring quotas to counteract "persistent and egre-
gious" discrimination); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516-17 (1980) (upholding fed-
eral statute creating racial quotas which guaranteed minority owned businesses percent-
age of federal grants, Justice Burger finding that "Congress had the right to remedy past
discrimination and these remedies need not be colorblind"); United Steel Workers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 200-09 (1979) (holding use of training program quota that allowed private
employers opportunity to give minority workers special treatment in hiring, training and
promotions constitutional).
114 See Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to Authorize
the States to Implement Race Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L. REV. 903, 922
(1992) (stating that employers recognized usefulness of numerical goals and timetables in
opening previously closed career opportunities to women and minorities); Deborah Gra-
ham, It's Getting Better Slowly, 72 A.B.A. J. 54, 54 (1986) (indicating that women have
entered legal field in unprecedented numbers because traditional barriers have fallen);
Kathryn J. Rodgers, Affirmative Action, 81 A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (1995) (noting that because of
affirmative action, women and minorities are able to compete for positions they are quali-
fied for but previously denied because of stereotypes); Gerald S. Janoff, Comment, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Supreme Court To Decide the Fate of Affirmative Action, 69
TUL. L. REV. 997, 1010 (1995) (recognizing that affirmative action has attempted to level
playing field to allow women and minorities equal access to opportunities).
115 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. It is noted that the Supreme Court is blind
to racism, advocating a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution. Id.; see also Mark S.
Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination
Decision and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13-17
(1989). This article provides case law examples of conservative Court's abandonment of
earlier liberal philosophies. Id.; Aaron Epstein, Supreme Court Steps Away From Race-
Based Remedies, ORANGE CouNTY REG., July 1, 1995, at A12. Epstein suggests that racial
minorities who were the winners of yesterday are the losers today. Id.; Richard Lacayo, The
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tices O'Connor's and Kennedy's recent willingness to take more
conservative stances more frequently. 1 16  This development
reveals a definitive split of the philosophy within the Court this
term. 
11 7
Concurrently, a fairly reliable four-vote liberal bloc has
emerged.1 18 Although the left wing of the Court has expressed
strong liberal views, it will be ineffective in eliminating the effects
Soul of a New Majority, Tam, July 10, 1995, at 46. It appears from the actions of the cur-
rent Court that the Earl Warren legacy has been "laid to rest." Id. "When in a single day
the Court can rule against a black-majority voting district.... in favor of public funding for
a Christian student magazine and... approve a cross erected by the Klu Klux Klan in a
public park, it can't be much fun anymore to be a liberal justice." Id.; O'Brien, supra note
96, at 2. O'Brien argues that the effects of discrimination are still a reality within our
society and concludes it is doubtful whether the Court has provided the necessary tools to
address the problem. Id.
116 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522-23 (1995) (permitting alloca-
tion of public funds for private religious activities); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,
2485-86 (1995) (determing that race cannot be primary factor in drawing election bounda-
ries); Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-301 (1995) (creating more stringent standard
for prisoner suits challenging prison conditions); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038,
2040-41 (1995) (holding that Court of Appeals had exceeded its authority in creating deseg-
regation remedy); Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) (limiting congres-
sional power to regulate activities that incidentally affect interstate commerce); see also
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: SUPREME COURT AND MIoRIrs IN CON-
TEMPORARY AMERICA 127 (1993) (stating that after President Reagan's appointment of con-
servative Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, Supreme Court was finally able to issue
majority opinion in constitutional affirmative action case); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second
Front in the Fight For Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress and Statutory Fees, 69
Thx L. Rxv. 291, 295 (1990) (suggesting that Supreme Court has erected "substantial road-
blocks to prosecution of civil rights cases, undermined favorable civil rights precedent and
created uncertainty about the sustaining of past progress" and that emergence of five Jus-
tice majority, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
O'Connor and Thomas has been characterized as "first conservative majority in half a cen-
tury" to hand down these decisions); Erwin Chermerinsky, The Crowded Center, 80 A.B.A.
J. 78, 79 (1994) (indicating that Court's staunch conservative bloc, that of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have on many occasions attracted votes of Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy for conservative result); Election Year Supreme Court, BALTI-
MORE SUN, Oct. 15, 1995, at 2F (indicating that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have voted
with conservative bloc of Court in recent terms); Ross, supra note 90, at *24 (noting that
although Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are more pragmatic than conservative, they con-
tinue to basically vote conservative).
117 See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522-23 (same); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485-86 (indicat-
ing five to four split of Court); Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299-301 (same); Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at
2040-41 (same); Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1630 (same); see also Greenhouse, supra note 67, at Al.
This article explains that the center has disappeared from the Court this term. Id.. The
appointments of Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, both pragmatic moderates, were expected
to anchor a strong central bloc on the Court. Id. Both easily won Senate confirmation
through strong bipartisan support. Id. However, the current make-up of the Court is far
from converging toward a central moderate position. Id. Instead, Justices Ginsberg and
Breyer have aligned themselves on the liberal side of the dividing line with Justices Ste-
vens and Souter. Id.
118 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533-51 (1995) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg,
Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497-509 (1995) (same); Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at
2302-10 (1995) (same); Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2073-91 (same); Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651-65
(1995) (same).
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of prior discrimination unless it can persuade Justices O'Connor
or Kennedy to adopt its viewpoint more often. 1 9 Indeed, Justice
O'Connor has demonstrated that she will not always agree with
her conservative colleagues.' 20 As a result, in the most controver-
sial areas, such as racial preferences,121 religious liberty,122 abor-
119 See Dori Meinert, Major Cases on Supreme Court's Docket This Term, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRiB., Oct. 1, 1995, at Al (recognizing that Court's conservative bloc dominated
when they were able to get Justices O'Connor and Kennedy to vote with them, however
when Court's liberal Justices were able to persuade either O'Connor or Kennedy, they were
victorious); Lacayo, supra note 115, at 46 (noting that unless liberal wing can attract
O'Connor or Kennedy to their side more frequently, liberal bloc on Court is in danger of
becoming "a vestigial organ, visible but pointless").
120 See Jilda M. Aliotta, Justice O'Connor and Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine
Voice, 78 JuDICATURE 232, 233 (1995) (suggesting that Justice O'Connor's record indicates
she is not "knee-jerk conservative"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Is the Rehnquist Court Really
That Conservative? An Analysis of 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 987, 987 (1993)
(recognizing that Justice O'Connor asserted independence in key cases effectively prevent-
ing conservatives from drastically changing law); Aaron Epstein, Kennedy, O'Connor Hold
Key to Direction of Court, NEWS TRmui'E (Tacoma), Oct. 1, 1995, at D1 (stating that Justice
O'Connor "applied brakes to what might otherwise have been a runaway right-wing
juggernaut").
121 See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 469, 470 (1989). In this decision,
which was written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that a city plan requiring
contractors to hire minority subcontractors was unconstitutional. Id.; see also John Payton,
The Meaning and Significance of the Croson Case, 1 GEo. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 59, 62-79
(1990). In this article, Payton details the necessary components to satisfy strict scrutiny
under O'Connor's decision. Id.; Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action
and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1749-55 (1989).
This article explains Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson by focusing on her treatment of
racial classifications which she believes cause stigmatic harm, perpetrate notions of racial
inferiority and serve the aims of racial politics. Id. Further asserting her support for strict
scrutiny, Rosenfeld articulates her analysis of constitutionally permissible programs under
that level of review. Id.; Jill B. Scott, Note, Will the Supreme Court Continue to Put Aside
Local Government Set-Asides As Unconstitutional?: The Search for an Answer in City Of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 197, 213-19 (1990). The article examines
the Croson plan under O'Connor's strict scrutiny review. Id.
122 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (O'Connor, J., joining in opin-
ion of Court) (arguing that government may not promote or affiliate itself with any form of
religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 637 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(concluding that creche suggests christianity is favored religion and is unconstitutional be-
cause government cannot advocate particular religion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting implementation of "endorsement test" to
analyze government stances on religion by scrutinizing communicated message to deter-
mine if it is either endorsement or disapproval of religion); see also Barbara S. Barrett,
Religious Displays and First Amendment: County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 404-05 (1990) (indicating that Justice O'Connor
believes government endorsement of religion is unconstitutional); Mark A. Boatman, Lee v.
Weisman : In Search of Defense for Establishment Clause, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 773, 776-77
(1993) (suggesting that Justice O'Connor's 'endorsement test" is likely to persuade future
courts as appropriate standard, which subsequently occurred in Allegheny); David J. Roop,
Jr., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union: Symbolic Analysis Under The
Establishment Clause, 1 MD. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 267, 270 (1990) (noting that Jus-
tice O'Connor provided swing votes in Lynch and Allegheny); Christopher S. Nesbit, Note,
County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test, 68 N.C. L. REV. 590,
590 (1990) (explaining that Court's decision in Allegheny represents first time Court ac-
cepted Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test" as analytical framework). But see Steven G.
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tion,123 and federalism, 124 Justice O'Connor appears to possess
great power as the "swing vote" on the Court.125
The current disposition of the Court not only raises issues re-
garding how it will decide future affirmative action cases, but also
evokes concerns about the course it will follow when a vacancy on
Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 481 (1994)
(suggesting that Justice O'Connor implementation of "objective observer" analysis within
her "endorsement test" framework relays messages to religious minorities that their per-
ceptions are either wrong or do not matter).
123 See, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2791 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
joining opinion of Court) (reaffirming essential holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
that woman has fundamental right to abortion without undue interference from state);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458-60 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding that
waiting period between notification to parents of minors' choice to have abortion and per-
formance of abortion is constitutional); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2972, 2978-83 (1990) (O'Connor, J., joining in opinion of Court) (holding judicial bypass
procedure of statute requiring parental notification of abortion complies with Fourteenth
Amendment); see also William Goodwine, Jr., Abortion Parental Notification Statutes:
Hodgson v. Minnesota and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 14 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 237, 244 (1991) (indicating that Justice O'Connor appears to be aligning herself
with liberal side of Court on abortion issues maintaining that abortion is constitutionally
protected right and providing liberals with necessary fifth vote to form majority); Stephen
J. Wermiel, O'Connor: A Dual Role-An Introduction, 13 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 129, 135-36
(1991) (submitting that Justice O'Connor's swing vote on issue of abortion makes many
women nervous of her power); Kenneth R. Wing, The Supreme Court's Spring Term: Abor-
tion, the Right to Die and the Decline of Privacy Rights, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 919,
922 (1990) (indicating that Justice O'Connor has emerged as swing vote in abortion cases
maintaining abortion as fundamental constitutional right); Andrea M. Sharvin, Note, Po-
tential Fathers and Abortion: A Woman's Womb Is Not a Man's Castle, 55 BROOK. L. REv.
1359, 1404 n.11 (1990) (stating that swing vote on abortion rests "solely with Justice
O'Connor"); Wynn H. Sourial, Comment, The Erosion of Roe v. Wade: Do Minors Have Any
Rights?, 13 WHrrrIER L. REV. 285, 324 (1992) (stating that Justice O'Connor played pivotal
role in Hodgson case by siding with liberal side of Court and rejecting efforts of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist to require notification from both parents); Natalie Wright, Note, State Abor-
tion Law After Casey: Finding Adequate and Independent Grounds for Choice in Ohio, 54
OHIo ST. L.J. 891, 896 (1993) (noting that in Casey for first time Justice O'Connor became
swing vote in abortion case).
124 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154-59 (1992) (indicating, in
O'Connor's opinion, that judiciary has duty to police congressional encroachment on auton-
omy of states in compliance with Tenth Amendment); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
456-65 (1991) (discussing premises of federlism); see also M. David Gelfand & Keith
Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court: Currents and
Cross-Currents from Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1443, 1449-56 (1990)
(explaining Justice O'Connor's conservative approach to federalism in that she often comes
to defense of state and local governments); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 639-52 (1993) (outlining Justice O'Connor's view-
point on federalism).
125 See William H. Freivogel, Making Things Right, ST. LouiS POST-DIsPATcH, July 2,
1995, at El. Justice O'Connor is the most influential member of the Court. Id. The outcome
of Supreme Court decisions are frequently within her control. Id. "She is a consummate
balancer of interests" who believes it is the Court's responsibility to create fine distinctions
and rejects the sweeping generalizations advocated by Scalia. Id. The polarization of the
Court is almost irrelevant because the decisions come down to the viewpoints of O'Connor
and at times Kennedy. Id. Justice O'Connor most frequently votes with the liberal core of
the Court in cases involving women, children and the death penalty. Id.
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the bench arises.' 26 The most crucial cases this term, including
Adarand, were decided by 5-4 votes, 127 indicating the fragile bal-
ance of the current Court. 128
B. The Interpretation of Adarand
While the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutional underpin-
nings of affirmative action in the Adarand decision, its ultimate
fate will be decided in the political arena and by the lower
courts.' 29 Since Adarand failed to resolve the affirmative action
debate in categorical terms, it left to Congress and to the lower
courts the responsibility of determining how to implement and
monitor federal affirmative action programs which provide bene-
fits based on race within the constitutionally articulated guide-
lines. 130 Congress will be responsible for amending federal affirm-
126 See Robert W. Bennett, Styles of Judging, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 853, 853 (1990) (sug-
gesting that centrality, strength and importance of judicial review have made selection
process for Supreme Court among most important for public office especially because ap-
pointments are for life tenure); Stephen L. Carter, Why the Confirmation Process Can't Be
Fixed, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993) (discussing opportunity of President to alter and
shape policy through Supreme Court nomination); Kevin T. McGuire, Book Review, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 622, 622 (1995) (noting that composition of Supreme Court has substan-
tial legal and political consequences and because of this Presidents are particularly careful
in selecting nominees to ensure their ideologies will be followed).
127 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2522-23 (1995) (permitting alloca-
tion of public funds for private religious activities); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,
2485-86 (1995) (determining that race cannot be primary factor in drawing election bound-
aries); Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-301 (1995) (creating more stringent stan-
dard for prisoner suits challenging prison conditions); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038,
2040-41 (1995) (holding that Court of Appeals had exceeded its authority in creating deseg-
regation remedy); Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) (limiting congres-
sional power to regulate activities that incidentally affect interstate commerce).
128 See Adolphus L. Williams, Jr., A Critical Analysis of the Bakke Case, 16 S.U. L. REV.
129, n.172 (1989) (noting that 5-4 decision is least desirable because it suggests deeply
divided court, creates possibility decision will be tested again in future and suggests that
slightly altered facts may persuade one Justice to reconsider and change his or her opin-
ion); Amy L. Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Deci-
sion's Vote, Age and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 82 GEo. L. J. 1689, 1689 (1994) (discussing reduced precedential value of 5-4
decisions).
129 See James Carney, Mend It, Don't End It, Tim, July 31, 1995, at 35 (indicating Presi-
dent Clinton's support for affirmative action programs); Maura Dolan, Wilson to Sue State
Over 'Affirmative Action Laws: Governor Wants Appellate Court to Overturn Preference
Given to Women and Minority-Owned Firms, L.A. Tnems, Aug. 10, 1995, at Al (explaining
Governor Wilson's staunch disapproval of affirmative action and current lawsuit against
state for implementing such programs); Greenhouse, supra note 67, at Al (suggesting polit-
ical arena will be ultimate forum to decide future of affirmative action); Kevin Meride, Dole
Aims at Affirmative Action Bill to End Racial, Gender Preferences, WASH. POST, July 28,
1995, at A10 (suggesting Congressional Republicans will use Adarand as basis for elimi-
nating federal preference programs).
130 See Charles Oliver, Is Affirmative Action In or Out? Supreme Court Ruling Will Take
Years To Sort Out, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, June 28, 1995, at Al. It is noted that the
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ative action programs to ensure that their provisions will pass
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny. 131 The lower courts
then must review such programs according to the Adarand frame-
Adarand decision did not provide guidance to Congress as to the quality or quantity of
evidence that is required to uphold a race based remedy under new standard of review. Id.;
see also Affirmative Action--Clinton Defends Federal Programs, FACTS ON FiLE WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, July 20, 1995. This article notes that President William J. Clinton signed an
executive order on July 19, 1995 in which he directed all federal agencies to ensure that
their programs meet the strict scrutiny requirements of Adarand. Id.; President Clinton's,
Remarks on Affirmative action at the National Archives, U.S. NEwswIRE (July 19, 1995).
President Clinton vigorously defended affirmative action policies following the completion
of a five-month-long review of federal affirmative action programs. Id. President Clinton
stated that the purpose of affirmative action is to provide our nation with a means to ad-
dress the systematic exclusion of individuals from opportunities to develop, perform,
achieve and contribute on the basis of their race. Id. He contended that affirmative action
makes education, employment and business opportunities available to members of groups
who have experienced continuous discrimination. Id. The President distinguished affirma-
tive action from promotion of unqualified individuals over qualified individuals without
regard to merit and expressed his dissatisfaction with numerical quotas. Id. In confronting
the high unemployment rates for African-Americans and Hispanics and the gap in earning
potential between women and men the President concluded that affirmative action remains
a useful tool for equalizing economic and educational opportunities, since disparities
among races in the work force still exist. Id. Finally, President Clinton directed all federal
agencies to comply with the Supreme Court's Adarand decision. Id. He listed four stan-
dards of fairness that should apply to all affirmative action programs: (1) no quotas in
theory or practice; (2) no illegal discrimination of any kind, including reverse discrimina-
tion; (3) no preference for people who are not qualified for any job or other opportunity; and(4) as soon as a program has succeeded, it must end. Id. Moreover, any program that fails
to meet these principles must either be eliminated or reformed to meet them. Id.; Text of
Memorandum on Affirmative Action from President Clinton to Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies, U.S. NEWSWIRE (July 19, 1995). This memorandum directed all federal
agencies to eliminate any program which creates quotas, preferences for unqualified indi-
viduals, reverse discrimination or continues after its equal opportunity purposes have been
achieved. Id.; The Best Policy May Be Race-Neutral, but Nation Must Guarantee Opportu-
nity, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, June 14, 1995, at A10. President Clinton has indicated his sup-
port for reforming affirmative action to achieve race-neutral language rather than elimi-
nating such programs. Id.; cf Kevin Merida, Dole Aims at Affirmative Action; Bill to End
Federal Racial, Gender Preferences Goes Beyond Court Ruling, WASH. POST, July 28, 1995,
at A10. Dole chose to introduce legislation, titled the Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, that
would end race and gender based federal affirmative action programs in contracting, hiring
and other federally conducted activities. Id. This goes far beyond the Supreme Court's view
in the Adarand decision. Id. The legislation comes at a precarious time for Republicans in
the Congress. Id. Republicans are debating between implementing an approach to disman-
tle affirmative action or a more moderate stance designed to indicate to minorities and
women that the party is not ignoring their concerns. Id.; If Not Affirmative Action, What?,
SET-ASIDE ALERT (Small Business Press), July 3, 1995. Senator Dole's proposal would end
the use of all preferences based on race, gender, or national origin, prohibit the federal
government from "requiring or encouraging" federal contractors to use racial or gender
preferences in hiring or selecting subcontractors and suppliers and forbid the federal gov-
ernment and courts from using racial and gender preferences as remedies for discrimina-
tion. Id.
131 See Terry Eastland, Rule Of Law: Congress and Clinton, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1995,
at A19. This article indicates that the Supreme Court left to Congress and the President
the task of resolving the affirmative action debate. Id.; Roger K. Lowe, Affirmative Action
Ruling Leaves Clinton in Difficulty, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 18, 1995, at 3B. It is noted
that a heated debate regarding affirmative action has emerged which will transcend into
political arena. Id.
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work to determine whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. 13
2
III. ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING FEDERAL PROGRAMS BASED ON
ADARAND ANALYSIS
It is submitted that some affirmative action programs will sur-
vive the strict scrutiny standard promulgated by Adarand. Justice
O'Connor specifically articulated that the mere application of
strict scrutiny alone should not prove fatal to affirmative action
programs. 1 33 However, in order for affirmative action programs to
survive this higher standard of review they must be revised to
comply with the requirements of strict scrutiny.
A. Strict Scrutiny Requirements
For a program to satisfy the compelling governmental interest
component, there must exist more than general societal discrimi-
nation.1 3 4 The governmental actor must specify the past discrimi-
nation that is responsible for the preference program 35 and
demonstrate that this past discrimination has present effects.' 36
The Court determines the existence of past discrimination by ex-
amining historical, anecdotal and statistical evidence. 1 37
After it is determined that a preference program serves a com-
pelling governmental interest, it will be scrutinized to ensure that
it is narrowly tailored. 38 In determining whether a plan is nar-
132 See Administration Issues Guidelines in Adarand's Wake, SET-ASIDE ALERT (Small
Business Press), July 17, 1995 (suggesting that Supreme Court gave little guidance to
lower courts on application of strict scrutiny, in particular, how it is defined in practice);
Biskupic, supra, note 93, at Al (discussing that lower courts will have to determine evi-
dence required to pass strict scrutiny analysis under Adarand); Court Curtails Affirmative
Action and School Desegregation Order Stricter Test Mandated For Federal Preferences,
NEWS AND OBSERVER (N.C.), June 13, 1995 at Al (noting that lower courts will begin to play
new role in federal affirmative action because latitude to congressionally enacted programs
has been eliminated); Neil Munro, Front News, WASH. TEcH., July 27, 1995 (explaining
that Adarand decision directed lower courts to strictly scrutinize federal affirmative action
programs to ensure they meet compelling need and are tailored to counter specific
discrimination).
133 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
134 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989).
135 See id. at 500.
136 See Podberskey v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 56 (4th Cir. 1992).
137 See Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., Civ A No.89-T-196-N, 1995 WL 494913,
at *18 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 1995) (stating that "under strict scrutiny, the court must look to
historical, anecdotal, and statistical evidence to determine whether there is past
discrimination").
138 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994) (explaining that under
strict scrutiny Court determines whether restriction is necessary to serve compelling gov-
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rowly tailored, the courts have considered many factors: (1) the
efficiency of alternative remedies; (2) the planned duration of the
remedy; (3) the relationship between the percentage of minority
workers to be employed and the percentage of minority groups in
the relevant population; (4) the availability of waiver provisions;
and (5) the effect of the plan on innocent third parties. 139
B. Examples of Affirmative Action Plans Under Strict Scrutiny
Although a federal program has not been analyzed within the
strict scrutiny framework, state programs that have passed strict
scrutiny review provide an adequate indication of the type of fed-
eral program likely to be sustained by the courts. 140 The affirma-
tive action program upheld in Alexander v. Prince George's
County. 4 ' provides an example of the factors federal courts will
consider under strict scrutiny. This case involved six white males
who challenged the Fire Department's decision not to hire them,
claiming they would have been hired if not for the Department's
affirmative action plan.1 42
The County presented the trial court with extensive statistical
and historical evidence of discrimination in the hiring of minority
firefighters.143 In addition, a long history of discrimination was re-
vealed through anecdotal evidence.1 4 4 It was clear that African-
Americans were not welcome within the Department.145 Examples
of discrimination against African-Americans included being re-
ferred to as "niggers," returning to their desk to find a cross in-
scribed with "R.I.P." and decorated with a sheet designed like a
klansman's hood, and being prevented from driving trucks. 146
ernmental interest and if it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end); Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3029 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that strict scrutiny
requires statute to be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling governmental interest in
order to pass constitutional muster); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (stating that
strict scrutiny requires that there be compelling state interest to enact law that it be nar-
rowly drawn to serve that purpose).
139 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 187 (1987).
140 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (indicating programs that both have and
have not passed strict scrutiny in past).
141 Civ. AW-93-2636, CIV. AW-94-2030, 1995 WL 603297, at *10 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 1995).
142 See id. at *1.
143 See id. at *7.
144 See id. at *8.
145 See id. at *7-9.
146 See Alexander v. Prince Greorge's County, Civ. AW-93-2636, CIV. AW-94-2030, 1995
WL 603297 at *7-9 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 1995).
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Furthermore, the Court found the plan to be narrowly tailored
to achieve the compelling interest of remedying past discrimina-
tion.147 First, alternative remedies, including intensifying minor-
ity recruitment, were not effective.' 4 8 Second, the plan was limited
in duration and reviewed annually to determine if its goals had
been achieved. 149 Third, the plan was designed to remedy present
racial imbalances specifically resulting from past discrimina-
tion. 50 Further, the plan was flexible, in that it did not require
the Department to hire a certain number of minorities. 5 ' Lastly,
the Plan did not have a severe impact on third parties because it
did not bar the hiring of other employees and, in fact, the Depart-
ment continued to hire many white males. 52 Moreover, the plan
merely gave a preference to minority applicants, not a guarantee
of employment. 5 3 Because of these factors, the Court concluded
that the plan was sufficiently narrowly tailored to further a
compelling governmental interest and was thus considered
constitutional. 154
The Court has expressly provided a framework within which af-
firmative action programs will survive strict scrutiny. 5 5 If a pro-
gram is tailored within these guidelines it will be held constitu-
tional as it was in Alexander.156 If the preference program fails to
meet the stated requirements, however, it will be struck down.' 57
For example, in Wittmer v. Peters5 ' the Court struck down a
race-based preference program for failure to meet the narrowly
tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test."' In this case, employees
of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("DOC") claimed that the
warden's decision to promote an African-American to the position





151 See Alexander v. Prince Greorge's County, Civ. AW-93-2636, CIV. AW-94-2030, 1995




155 See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117-18 (1995).
156 See Alexander v. Prince Greorge's County, Civ. AW-93-2636, CIV. AW-94-2030, 1995
WL 603297 at *7-9 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 1995).
157 See Wittmer v. Peters, No. 94-3045, 1995 WL 631639 at *7 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1995).
158 No. 94-3045, 1995 WL 631639 (C. D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1995).
159 See id. at *7.
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tion Clause. 160 Promotions at the DOC were based on scores re-
ceived from a physical agility test, a written examination and an
oral interview. 16 1 The warden chose to promote five white appli-
cants who ranked first, fourth, fifth, tenth and eleventh and an
African-American applicant who ranked forty-second. 162 The
plaintiffs, ranked third, sixth, and eighth brought this action in
response to the warden's decision to promote a less qualified mi-
nority applicant. 163 The State of Illinois argued that it had a com-
pelling interest "in the safe, efficient, and successful operation of
its boot camps."1 6 4 To that end, it claimed that the consideration of
race in promotional decisions were within its "operational needs"
since a majority of its prison population were minorities. 16 The
DOC feared that failure to promote minority employees would
lead to the perception that the boot camp was racially motivated
and consequently defeat its purpose of instilling discipline and re-
spect for authority. 166
The Court agreed that the State had a compelling interest in the
safe operation of its boot camps. 167 The Court, however, held that
the DOC failed to implement the necessary safeguards to pass
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny. 168 There was no evi-
dence of past discrimination against minorities in the DOC's pro-
motional practices. 169 Further, the state failed to provide evidence
as to why African-American representation at the lieutenant posi-
tion as opposed to the officer position was essential to the safe
functioning of the boot camp. 170 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that the promotion of an African-American male was not neces-
sary to further the state's compelling interest to operate safe
facilities. 17 1
160 See id. at *2.
161 See id. at *1.
162 See id. at *2.
163 See Wittmer v. Peters, No. 94-3045, 1995 WL 631639, at *2 (C.D. I. Aug. 31, 1995).
164 See id. at *3.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id. at *6-7.
168 See Wittmer v. Peters, No. 94-3045, 1995 WL 631639, at *3-7 (C.D. IM. Aug. 31,
1995).
169 See id. at *2.
170 See id. at *6-7.
171 See id.
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Another example of a preference program that failed to meet
strict scrutiny is provided in Koski v. Gainer.17 2 In Koski, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
examined the affirmative action plan of the Illinois State police
("ISP"). 173 The purpose of the program was to achieve percentage
parity between the ISP workforce and that of the general popula-
tion. 174 Racial parity was obtained through numerical goals. 175 In
analyzing the program, the Court considered the factors espoused
in Paradise to determine whether the preference program was
narrowly tailored. 17 6
First, the Court concluded that the state had satisfactorily
sought alternative remedies by participating in minority recruit-
ing efforts unrelated to the application process. 177 Next, the Court
examined the flexibility of the program and the duration of its re-
lief. 178 This aspect of the plan failed the narrowly tailored require-
ment in that it maintained the same percentage goals since its
inception and was based on overbroad figures obtained from the
state census. 179 Accordingly, the Court held that the ISP plan vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.18 0 From the previous cases, it should be clear that a prefer-
ence program can survive strict scrutiny review so long as it
adheres to constitutional guidelines and implements sufficient
safeguards.
CONCLUSION
The 1960's enlightened the American public to the evils of racial
discrimination. The Supreme Court was instrumental in creating
the legal framework necessary to battle long existing racial
prejudices. In so doing, the Court supported remedies, including
race based preference programs, to end racial discrimination. Re-
cently, such programs have come under constitutional attack. In
Adarand the Court promulgated that federal race-based prefer-
172 No. 92C3293, 1995 WL 599052 (N. D. Il. Oct. 5, 1995).
173 See id. at *1-3.
174 See id. at *4.
175 See id.
176 See id. at *15.
177 See Koski v. Gainer, No. 92C3293, 1995 WL 599052, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1995).
178 See id. at *15-17.
179 See id. at 17.
180 See id. at *21.
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ence programs are to be reviewed under strict scrutiny and out-
lined the components necessary for a program to survive this level
of constitutional review. It appears if a federal program incorpo-
rates sufficient safeguards to ensure that it is narrowly tailored
and illustrates a history of validated discrimination, it will pass
strict scrutiny. Although strict scrutiny is the highest level of re-
view, it is possible to satisfy its requirements. Strict scrutiny is
strict in theory but not necessarily fatal in fact.
Karen M. Berberich

